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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE' CASE
This is an action involving a dispute of the ownership
of a strip of land approximately 70 feet by 969 feet located
between the Plaintiff's (Appellant's) property on the west,
and the Defendant's (Respondent's.) property on the east..

The

Appellants claim that their predecessors in title acquired
ownership of the disputed strip of land through "boundary by
acquiescence",

establishing

an

"old

fence"

line which

had

defined the boundary between the properties for

more

forty-five

that said

(45) years as the boundary line;

predecessors

then

conveyed

ownership

to

and

the

than

Plaintiffs/-

Appellants through deeds, which have transferred ownership of
the disputed strip of land to the Plaintiffs/Appellants.
The Defendants/Respondents claim that

their

title

is

based upon surveys and deeds from their predecessors.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
AND THE SUPREME COURT
The

case was

tried

to

the

Court.

The

trial

court

entered judgment quieting title to the disputed strip of land
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to the Defendants/Respondents, concluding that the Plaintiffs
could not have relied upon the "old fence" as their boundary
line because they were charged with actual or constructive
notice of the recorded boundary line of MEADOW COVE NO. 2
SUBDIVISION, when they purchased their lots.
This Court, in a unanimous opinion, filed December 18,
1980,

reversed

the

decision

of

the

trial

court,

quieting

title therein to the Plaintiffs/Appellants.

RELIEF SOUGHT
The Appellants seek the denial of Respondents PETITION
FOR REHEARING, thus affirming this Courts decision published
on

December

18,

1980,

and

quieting

title

in

the

Plaintiffs/Appellants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action involves a dispute to the ownership of a
strip of

land

70 feet

by 969

feet,

as

shown on the plat

hereafter as PARCEL (1).
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PLAT OF PROPERTY

(BRANDON.PARK SUBDIVISION)
ALBERT DEAN
PARCEL (3)

MC DONALD BROTHERS
PARCEL (5)

W. 0. NELSON .

PARCEL (4)

Old Fence
Parcel (1)

I

I

White Fence

1

l___,__M_e_j....1d_o_w_<..,...~ove iubai111i.si4

i,_ _. . _ , ._ _ _

I

( l~eyno

I

l

j

.

~d Johnson1)

Pa ·eel

( 2)

No. 2

j
I

The appellants are owners of the lots
No.

Subdivision,

2

Subdivision
PORTER

was

BROS.

Parcel

developed

acquired

on

(2)

by

the

the

plat.

PORTER BROS.,
property

in Meadow Cove

they

Meadow

Cove

1973 ..

When

thought

their

in

property went east to the "old fence",

[Record p. 188, 189]

however when they hired Bush

to survey for

subdivision,

&

upon the surveyors

Gudgell
advice

[Record p.

12]

their
they

accepted the east boundary of the subdivision to be seventy
( 7 0 ) feet west of the

"o 1 d fence "

[Record p • 18 8 , 18 9 ] even

though the subdivision plat does not agree with the deeded
description from Reynold Johnson, their predecessor in title
[Record p. 295].
Until Porter Brothers developed Meadow Cove Subdivision
in 1973, all the property shown on the plat as parcels (1),
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(2),

(3),

(4) and (5) were open fields divided only by the

"old fence" [Record p. 214, 215].
The
Dean,

"old fence"

moved

onto

was built prior to 1925 when Albert

Parcel

( 3)

[Record p.

205]

and

when he

purchased Parcel ( 3) in 1935, he was informed that the "old
fence" was the west boundary of his property [Record p. 206].
From that time until 1973, for a period of at least 48
years, the undisputed evidence shows that the owners on both
sides of the "old fence" acquiesced in the "6ld fence" as the
boundary 1 ine between the properties

[Record p.

314,

315,

320, 212, 213, 222].

The Appellant's predecessor in title, Reynold Johnson
purchas_ed the property ref erred to as Parcel ( 1) and ( 2) in
1943

[Exhibit _D-5].

He

was

told

everything east to the "old fence"

that

he

was

acquiring

[Record p. 212].

During

the entire time he owned the property, he occupied, used, and
farmed the property east to the "old fence",

[Record p. 213]

until he sold in 1971, when he deeded to South [Exhibit P-14]
telling the Buyer they were buying to the "old fence" on the
east [Record p. 217]. Johnson never had the property surveyed
[Record p.

222]

but relied solely on the location of the

fences to define the boundary.
The Respondents

introduced absolutely no _evidence to

controvert the establishment of boundary by acquiescence.
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In

proof

of

Respondents

based upon surveys,
both

the

numerous

deeds on

and

discrepancies
[Record p.
both~

that

their

and deeds to the land,

Appellant's

293-295] ,

claim

402] •

with

engineers,

the

was

it was shown by

Respondent's

existed

title

deeds

that

[Record

p.

Both surveyors agreed that the

sides of the "old fence" failed to close, and

had errors in the description [Record p. 293, 380, 402].
On the east side of the

"old fence"

the Respondent's

deeds overlap into Meadow Cove Subdivision by 26 feet [Record
p.

381,

382].

descriptions

The
[Record

deed

on

Parcel

385,

386],

and

(4)

came

with

by

using

the

two
main

description (a second description was in parenthesis) there
was a 68 foot gap, which would closely agree with the "old
fence" as the boundary.
With

regard

Respondent's
[Record p.

to

Parcel

Counsel

391]

and

(5)

admitted

their

the
they

Mc

Donald

had

own surveyor

a

Tract

problem

testified

the

there·

that

the

deed description under which the Respondents obtained Parcel
(5) only goes to the "old fence",

[Record 391, 395]

and not

to the "white fence" where Respondents seek to establish the
boundary.
The said Reynold Johnson having acquired title to the
disputed strip of land,

through boundary by acquiescence, he

then deeded to the Plaintiffs/Appellants,

[Exhibit P. 15].
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR REHEARING
RAISES NOTHING NEW, IMPORTANT, NOR SHOWS
ANY ERROR BY THE APPELLATE COURT.

In

Respondents

Pe ti ti on

for

Rehearing

and

BRIEF

in

Support of Petition for rehearing, the Respondents have again
repeated the same issues and quoted the same cases that were
before the Court on appeal.

The Respondents failed in trial

to introduce any evidence to dispute the boundary by acquiescence,

and

relied solely on the argument that because the

parties to this action were not the parties between whom the
boundary by acquiescense occurred, therefore a Court of
Equity should ignore the doctrine and decide who would have
the greater equity to be served.
This
Court.
been
/

reasoning

is

contrary

to

the

rulings

of

this

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has long

recognized

to SETTLE boundary disputes,

Review, Volume No.

1, Spring 1975 at page 224.

see Utah Law
This Court

has made clear that a boundary established by acquiescence is
binding not only on the acquiescing owners, but also on their
grantees, see Johnson vs. Sessions, 25 Ut 2d 133, 477 P 2d
788, (1970).
In the case of Provonsha v. Johnson, 6 U 2d 26, 305 P
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2d 486 (1956) this Court dealt with a boundary fence in place
some

for

35

years

concluded

and

29:

page

at

"If by the time a boundary by acquie-·
scence had been established, as we think it
had, under principles heretofore announced
by this Court, succeeding grantees could not
marshal! their disagreements or misunderstandings to destroy that established
boundary."
The Respondents re argue the same facts
Court

rejected

and

site

the

cases

of

the appellate

Florence v. Hiline ...,...,,

Equipment Company and Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation as
their sole authority for the decision they seek.

Both cases

are clearly distinguishable from the present case.
In Florence v. Hiline Equipment Company, 581, P 2d 998
(1978) this Court concluded:
"The trial court determined that the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescense does not apply to
the facts of this case~ •• although the fence
has been in existence for a number years,
there is nothing in the record to support the
claim that these parties have acquiesced in
treating the fence as their mutual boundary."
Citing

the

Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation

case,

this Court in Florence concluded:

"We cannot see the circumstances as justifying a conclusion that the parties acquiesced in regarding this fence as a boundary for
the sufficiently long period of time ... Likewise, on the facts now before us, we must
conclude as did the trial court that the
parties have not by their actions relied
upon the fence as being the true and
actual boundary."
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The

very

factual

requirements

cases, was shown without dispute,
case,

namely

the

true

boundary

missing

to exist
line

was

parties on both sides of the "old fence"
years,

acquiesced

and

relied

on

the

in

those

in the
unknown

two

instant
and the

for more than 40

"old

fence"

as

the

boundary line.
Accordingly this Court concluded in its December 18,
1980 decision at page 2:

"It is clear from the undisputed evidence that
plaintiffs and their predecessors in title and
interest had occupied, possessed and used the
land included in the disputed strip for more
than 40 years as the owners thereof; that the
land had been bounded by a visible fence during
all that time, which fence had been accepted by
the adjoining landowners as the boundary line
between their respective tracts of land.
The evidence introduced at trial, by the Plaintiffs/Appellants, shows this case, without controverting evidence, to
be the classic case of boundary by acquiescenceG
The Respondent has in its petition reargued its appeal
with nothing new added, no new evidence shown and no error
shown, except that Respondents want a different decision.
This Court has

held

that

a

rehearing should not be

granted, where nothing new and important, was offerred for
consideration.
Ducheneau v. House 4 Ut 483, 11 P 618 (1886 ), further
_\.!;
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when the Supreme Court has considered and decided all the
material questions involved in a case, a rehearing should not
be applies for, unless the Court
fact or facts,

misconstr~ed

some material

or overlooked some statute· or some decision

which might affect the result, or based the decision on a
wrong principal of law.

See Cummings v. Nielson 42 Ut 157,

129 P. 619 ( 1913).
To justify a rehearing a strong case had to be made to
show the Court failed to consider some material point, or
erred in its conclusion or matter was discovered which was
unknown at the original hearing.
See In re MacKnight 4 Ut 237, 9 P 299 ( 1886)
Brown v. Pickard 4 Utah 292, 9 P 573, 11 P 512 ( 1886)
Q

No such showing has been made by the Respondent.
the

Respondent's

argument

of

equity

allowed

to

~

Were
reject

boundary by acquiescence in the instant case, the settling of
boundary disputes

through

this doctrine would become a

nullity in this state.
POINT II
THE APPELLATE COURT PROPERLY REVIEWED THE LAW
AND THE FACTS AND DETERMINED THAT THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENSE
VESTING TITLE IN THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS.

This Court has made clear -in numerous decisions that in
equity cases,

it

is

the

duty

and

the prerogative

of
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Supreme Court to review the law and the facts and if
necessary to make

its

own

findings

and

substitute

its

judgment for that of the trial court.
See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P 2d 1359 (1974);
Kier v. Condrack, 478 P 2d 327, 25 Ut 2d 129 (1970);
Richins v. Struhs, 412 P 2d 314, 17 Ut 2d 356 (1966);
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 522 P 2d 136 (1976).

Pursuant to that burden this Court reviewed the law
the facts and concluded at page 2:
"It is clear from the undisputed evidence
that Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title·
and interest and occupied, possessed and used the
land included in the disputed strip for more
than 40 years as the owners thereof; that the
land had been bounded by a visible fence during
all that time, which fance had been accepted
by the adjoining landowners as the boundary
line between their respective tracts of land.
It is also clear from the evidence that
none of the Defendants, nor their predecessors
in title and interest, had occupied, possessed,
used or claimed any of the land included in
the disputed strip for more than 40 years
prior to the filing of the legal action in
this matter.
Reynold Johnson had bought the land
west of the old fence in 1943. From that
date until 1971, he occupies and farmed the
land up to the old fence. He irrigated his
crops from the ditch that ran along the old
fence line immediately west of such fence.
He had acquired title to the disputed strip
of land by operation of law under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The
Defendants' predecessors in title and inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Page 11
terest held good title to their lands west
to the old fence, and only the bare record
title to any land west of the old fence that
was embraced within the descriptions in their
title doc~ments. Their legal title ta any
part of the disputed strip of land ha~ been
extinguished when Johnson's occupancy and
possession had riperied irtto a legal title."
The

basis

for

complaint because of the judges who heard and decided

the

case.,

Respondents

finally

attempt

to

find

This Court has set forth the standard for Rehearing

clearly.

In Shippers Best Express, Inc. vs. Newson, 579 P 2d

1316 (1978) this Court rejected a petition for rehearing and
concluded that:
"To set it aside required a vote of a
majority of those who heard the matter,
otherwise the judgment which was pronounced
by a majority of the Court stands.,"
(at
page 1319)
As stated by Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion
in the Skippers Best Express v. Newsom case at Pg 1318:
"It is totally foreign to my conception
of fairness and justice for a party to submit
his controversy to a Court for adjudication,
then wait ~o see whether he wins or loses, and
when he loses·t~ then attack the composition
of the court. That this may not properly be
donee" See People, etc. Tidwell et al, 5 Ut
88, 12 P 638; In re Thompson 72 Utah 17, 269
p 103, 128.,
/I
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CONCLUSIONS
The decision of this court reaffirms the long standing
doctrine

of boundary by acquiescence

disputes

in

the State of Utah.

settling property

The Plaintiffs/Appellants

have shown by undisputed evidence the establishment of all
elements of boundary by acquiescence for a period in excess
of 40 years, settling the boundary line as the "old fence".
The

Respondents

controvert
Further,

the

have

failed

application

of

to

show

any

the doctrine

the Defendants/Respondents have

evidence

to

in this case.

failed

to sustain

their own burden of showing their acquisition of the property
through valid deeds, and have failed to show a single case in
point which would refute the application of boundary by acquiescense in this classic case.
The Plaintiffs/Appellants therefore respectfully urge
the

Court

to deny

the Defendants/Respondents

Pe ti ti on for

Rehearing and affirm the unanimous decision of this Court.

Respectfully submitted this

C/~

day of February, 1981.

WALKER, HINTZE & WASHBURN, INC.

By
M. RICHARD WALKER
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
and Appellants
Suite 202, 4685 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone:
278-4747
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